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ABSTRACT The notion of decryption rights delegation was initially introduced by Blaze et al. in EURO-
CRYPT 1998. It, defined as proxy re-encryption, allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext intended
for a party to another ciphertext of the same plaintext, without knowledge of the underlying plaintext and
decryption key. It has been explored to many real-world applications, e.g., encrypted email forwarding.
However, the intrinsic all-or-nothing share feature of proxy re-encryption yields a limitation that the share
cannot be revoked. This may hinder the scalability of its applications in practice. In this paper, for the first
time, we define the concept of revocability in terms of decryption rights delegation. The novel concept
enables data owner to revoke the shared decryption rights when needed. Inspired by the seminal lattice-
based proxy re-encryption proposed in PKC 2014, we design a concrete lattice-based construction which
satisfies the notion. In our construction, we make use of binary-tree structure to implement the revocation
of decryption rights, so that the update of re-encryption key is reduced to O(logN ) (instead of O(N )), where
N is the maximum number of delegatee. Furthermore, the security of our scheme is based on the standard
learning with errors problem (LWE problem), which could be reduced to the worst-case hard problems (such
as GapSVP and SIVP) in the context of lattices. The scheme is chosen ciphertext secure in the standard
model. As of independent interest, our scheme achieves both backward and forward security, which means
that once a user is revoked after a time period t, it cannot gain access to all encrypted files before and after t.
INDEX TERMS Revocability, proxy re-encryption, lattice, learning with errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) was first intro-
duced by Blaze et al. [1] in EUROCRYPT 1998 to enable an
intermediate proxy to convert a ciphertext of Alice to that of
Bob without compromising the information of the underlying
plaintext. Alice here is known as the delegator while Bob is
the delegatee. The semi-trusted proxy can fulfil the conver-
sion with help of a re-encryption key given by the delegator.
PRE has been employed into many real-world applications,
e.g., encrypted email forwarding, and domain interoperability
manager (DIM) module in digital rights management (DRM)
systems.
As for the first example, while Alice is on vacation,
the email proxy may convert Alice’s incoming encrypted
emails to those which can be decrypted by secretary Bob
via the re-encryption key given by Alice, so that Bob can
handle the emails on behalf of Alice. The PRE mechanism
provides scalable and convenient features over data sharing:
(i) Alice does not need always to be online; (ii) Alice does
get rid of download-decrypt-and-re-encrypt mode to relieve
computation and communication complexity in data sharing;
(iii) Alice does not have to share her secret/decryption key
with Bob for encrypted data sharing.
PRE can also be employed to DRM systems. Digital con-
tent providers may leverage DRM mechanism to protect the
ownership and access rights of digital content from being
infringed by malicious Internet users. A DRM system is able
to bind digital content with ownership license, meanwhile,
only an authenticated user can access the content. DRM,
nevertheless, suffers from a domain limitation that a digital
VOLUME 6, 2018
2169-3536 
 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
61163
W. Yin et al.: Delegation of Decryption Rights With Revocability From Learning With Errors
content in the domain A can only be accessed by the devices
within that domain. That makes DRM non-scalable in practi-
cal use. DIM intermediate module, one of the typical applica-
tions of PRE technology, may come to help solve the domain
problem. Specifically, the module can be used to convert a
ciphertext (license) of the domainA to the ciphertext (license)
belonging to another domain, sayB. Furthermore, themodule
cannot extract the underlying plaintext from the ciphertexts
(licenses), so that the confidentiality of data but also effec-
tive cross-domain conversion are guaranteed (please refer to
Figure 1). But the DIM fails to support the revocability of
decryption rights delegation.
FIGURE 1. Effective DIM Interface in DRM.
Traditional PRE, being as a type of all-or-nothing decryp-
tion rights delegation, cannot allow a delegator to revoke its
shared decryption rights from delegatee (after a re-encryption
key is issued to the proxy). In the above encrypted email for-
warding setting, Bob can keep gaining access to all encrypted
emails intended for Alice (even if Alice is back to work). This
may not scale well in practice because one may prefer to only
share decryption rights with others within some fixed time
slots, for example, after returning to work, Alice may choose
to handle the emails on her own without any interference of
Bob. To the best of our knowledge, there is no PRE scheme (in
the context of public key encryption) dealing with the issue
of revocability.
One may think that revoking the delegation of decryption
rights is trivial in the sense that a delegator may just request a
proxy to delete the corresponding re-encryption key (so that
the re-encryption may be terminated). This naive solution,
we state, may work in the context where the sharing is not
time-related/updated. In practice, it may be difficult to isolate
data sharing from time period. In payTV application (e.g.
Netflix), an encrypted movie may be watched by subscribers
based on payment status. A re-encryption key here may
relate with a time period, say a month, so that subscribers
can decrypt and watch the movie in the month they’ve paid
the subscription fee. Simply deleting re-encryption key to
revoke a subscriber’s rights may not scale well, for instance,
the subscriber may join back in the next month. Another
concern here for the revocation is that if the revoked sub-
scriber is still able to gain access to the movies which are
encrypted before the revocation point. In addition to maintain
the confidentiality of data, the efficiency of revocation must
be taken into account. How to guarantee data confidentiality
in the revocation of time-related decryption rights delegation
without linear complexity that motivates our work.
In recent years, lattice-based cryptography has attracted
numerous attention from cryptographic researchers. The lat-
tice as an alternative underlying primitive is more and more
applicable to cryptographic schemes. Compared to the tra-
ditional cryptography based on number theory hard prob-
lems (e.g., integer factorization and discrete logarithm),
the promising features of lattice-based cryptography are as
follows: (i) it is conjectured to be secure against quan-
tum computer attacks; (ii) it is with algorithmic simplicity
and high parallelism; (iii) it has an average-case/worst-case
reduction for commonly used hard assumptions. This paper
also seeks a way to construct PRE with revocability in the
lattice-based setting to present secure system which can hold
against the attacks of quantum computers.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
1) To the best of our knowledge, we propose the notion
of revocable PRE, for the first time, in which the
revocability is linked with time period. The definition
and security model of revocable PRE are defined in
this paper. In the security model, an adversary should
follow the restrictions defined as in traditional PRE
setting and furthermore, it is allowed to update re-
encryption key and revoke system users. However, it is
restricted that the adversary cannot decrypt the cipher-
texts which are encrypted before/after the time period
of the revocation.
2) At a first glance, a trivial revocation system (as men-
tioned in the previous section) may incur that the revo-
cation complexity is linear in the number of users. Our
scheme relieves the workload of delegator from linear
to logarithmic complexity by using binary tree structure
to organize re-encryption keys. We also provide a non-
interactive re-encryption key update technique which
is used to shorten the time of key update (w.r.t. user
revocation).
3) The forward security is considered in our construction.
To achieve the goal, we need to update the ciphertext of
delegator that is stored in server whilst the correspond-
ing delegatee is revoked, say at time period t. After
confirming to revoke the decryption rights of Bob at t,
Alice will update the re-encryption key from herself to
Bob so that a proxy cannot convert the ciphertext of
Alice to Bob by using the updated re-encryption key.
But the proxy can still use the re-encryption keys that
are generated at t′ < t to convert the ciphertexts under t′
to Bob. The decryption capability of Bob is not revoked
in terms of the ciphertexts generated before t. To tackle
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this problem (to guarantee forward security), after the
update of re-encryption key, we make an update for
the ciphertext of Alice as well by executing algorithm
UpCipher (after ReKeyRev) to update the ciphertexts
of Alice under t′ < t.
4) A concrete lattice-based revocable PRE construction is
presented in this paper. The CCA security of our con-
struction is proved based on the hardness of the learning
with errors (LWE) in the standard model, which is as
hard as several worst-case lattice problems, such as
GapSVP for some factors O˜(n/α) or SIVPγ for some
polynomial factor γ = poly(n).
The main technical roadmap of our construction is to
design an interface to combine the technique of revocable
IBE [2] with PRE technique [3] to achieve efficient, non-
interactive and collusion-free PRE with revocability. Specif-
ically, we embed time information into public key of user
and split the public key into three parts and further, merge
re-encryption key into a binary tree structure. The time infor-
mation is compatible with [3] in terms of re-encryption key
generation, we therefore inject randomness to guarantee that
the time term on both sides of the equation will not be
eliminated, which is immune to a means of attack in [4]
(note more details are given in Section 5). Furthermore,
we prove that our scheme can hold against chosen ciphertext
attacks (CCA). The tricky part of security proof is on how to
answer re-encryption key queries issued by adversary. In the
real system, denoted by AR and AL the matrices should
satisfy [A′0|A′1 +H′G] = AR + AL, where AR and AL
are generated randomly. The method we adopt is to use an
invertible unimodular matrix U to constitute the public key
of user in the simulation. Let [A′0| − A′0R′1] = [UAR1 +
(I−U)AL1 |UAR2+(I−U)AL2 ], we chooseX00,X′00,X10 and
X′10 from a Gaussian distribution with parameter s, so that(
X′00
X′10
)
+
(
X00
X10
)
=
(
X00
X10
)
(
X′00
X′10
)
R′1 +
(
X00
X10
)
R′1 =
(
X01
X11
)
(
X′00
X′10
)
R′2 =
(
X02
X12
)
,
and further the re-encryption key from user pk∗ to pk ′ is
constructed as
rkpk∗−→pk ′ =
X00 + X′00 X01 + X′01 X′02X10 + X′10 X11 + X′11 X′12
0 0 I
.
B. RELATED WORK
There have been many research works on user revocation
to date. Boneh and Franklin [5] design a key revocation
mechanism that allows legitimate users to periodically update
the secret key corresponding to time slot. However, their key
update algorithm requires a trusted key issuer which con-
sumes computation and communication complexity linearly
in the number of non-revoked users. Besides, the key issuer
requires a secure channel to transmit the updated keys to
system users. Following the seminal work [5], fuzzy identity-
based encryption (IBE) and binary tree data structure are
creatively combined together to yield an identity revocation
scheme [6]. The scheme reduces the key update complex-
ity (on key issuer side) from linear to logarithmic level.
Chen et al. [2] later propose an IBE scheme from lattices with
efficient key revocation, and prove the scheme to be selective
secure in the standard model and under the LWE assumption.
Seo and Emura [7] design a concrete construction based on
pairings, in which the construction is able to hold against the
attacks, called decryption key exposure attack. Lee et al. [8]
propose an adaptive-identity security revocable IBE (RIBE)
scheme with pairings by using the subset difference method.
Ling et al. [9] deliver the first construction of lattice-based
revocable predicate encryption, satisfying the notion of full-
hiding security in the standard model.
Since its introduction, PRE has been well studied for
the past decades. Ateniese et al. [10] design a first unidi-
rectional PRE scheme, which is used as a mechanism of
access control over encrypted file system. Their scheme
is based on bilinear pairings and achieves the security of
chosen plaintext attack (CPA) in the standard model. Green
and Ateniese [11] introduce the notion of identity-based
PRE (IB-PRE) and propose a concrete construction satis-
fying the notion. The construction is unidirectional, multi-
hop, and proved to be CPA secure in random oracle model.
Canetti and Hohenberger [12] present the first CCA secure
bidirectional PRE with high efficiency in re-encryption. The
security is based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(DBDH) assumption in the standard model. In order to
achieve CCA security, they leverage one-time signature to
guarantee integrity of ciphertext. A new notion, called key
privacy, is introduced in [13] in the sense that a proxy can-
not obtain the identities of delegator and delegatee from a
given re-encryption key (i.e. achieving anonymity). Their
construction is with CPA security in the standard model.
A few replayable CCA (RCCA) secure unidirectional PRE
schemes in the standard model have been proposed by
Libert and Vergnaud [14]. Aono et al. [15] introduce the first
lattice-based PRE based on the LWE problem, which is CPA
secure in the standard model. Kirshanova et al. [3] present a
CCA1 secure PRE on top of [16].
The aforementioned schemes, however, cannot provide the
revocability of decryption rights delegation. We compare our
scheme with other related PRE schemes in Table 1 in terms
of functionality and security. We state that our scheme is the
first of its type achieving revocability and CCA security with
LWE in the standard model.
C. PAPER OUTLINE
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
some basic definitions, hard problems, and some conclusions
in lattices are given. In section 3, we present the definition
of revocable PRE (RPRE) and further formalize the security
model. In section 4, we give a concrete RPRE scheme and
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TABLE 1. Comparison with related PRE schemes.
prove its security in the standard model. In section 5, we con-
clude our work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. NOTATION
Throughout the paper we say that a function in n is negligible,
denoted by negl(n), if it vanishes faster than the inverse
of any polynomial in n. We say that a probability p(n) is
overwhelming if 1−p(n) is negligible. The statistical distance
between two distribution X and Y(or two random variables
having those distributions), viewed as functions over a count-
able domain D, is defined as 1(X ;Y) = 12
∑
s∈D |Pr[X =
s] − Pr[Y = s]|. We say that X and Y are statistically close
if d(λ) = 1(X (λ);Y(λ)) is a negligible function of λ, where
X (λ) and Y(λ) be ensembles of random variables.
We denote column vectors by lower-case bold letters
(e.g., x) and matrices by upper-case bold letters(e.g., X).
We identify a matrix X with the ordered set {xj} of its col-
umn vectors, and let X||X′ denote the concatenation of the
matrices X,X′. And we define ‖X‖ = maxj‖xj‖, where ‖ · ‖
denotes the Euclidean norm, 〈·〉 denotes inner product.
B. LATTICE DEFINITON
Definition 1 (Integer Lattice [19], [20]): Let B =
[b1| . . . |bm] ∈ Rm×m be an m × m matrix whose columns
are linearly independent vectors b1, . . . ,bm ∈ Rm. The m-
dimensional full-rank lattice 3 generated by B is the set,
3 = L(B) = {y ∈ Rm s.t. ∃s ∈ Zm, y = Bs =
m∑
i=1
sibi}
Here, we are interested in integer lattices, i.e., when L
is contained in Zm. We let det(3) denote the determinant
of 3. The dual lattice of 3, denoted 3∗, is defined to be
3∗ = {x ∈ Rn : ∀v ∈ 3, 〈x, v〉 ∈ Z}.
Definition 2 (q-Ary Lattice): For prime q, A ∈ Zn×mq and
u ∈ Znq, define:
3q(A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. ∃s ∈ Znq where A>s = e mod q}
3⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = 0 mod q}
3uq(A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = u mod q}
We can observe that if t ∈ 3uq(A) then 3uq(A) = 3⊥q (A) + t
and hence 3uq(A) is a shift of 3
⊥
q (A).
C. THE GRAM-SCHMIDT NORM
Definition 3 (Gram-Schmidt Norm): Let S be a set of vec-
tors S = {s1, . . . , sk} in Rm. We use the following standard
notations:
- ‖S‖ denotes the L2 length of the longest in S,
i.e., max 1≤i≤k‖si‖.
- S˜ := {s˜1, . . . , s˜k} ⊂ Rm denotes the Gram-Schmidt
orthogonalization of the vectors s1, . . . , sk taken in
that order.
We refer to ‖S˜‖ as the Gram-Schmidt norm of S.
Lemma 1 ([21], Lemma 7.1): There is a deterministic
poly-time algorithm ToBasis(S,B) that, given a full rank set S
of lattice vectors in 3 = L(B), outputs a basis T of 3 such
that ‖t˜i‖ ≤ ‖s˜i‖ for all i.
In 1996, Ajtai [22] showed how to sample an essentially
uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with an associated basis SA
of 3⊥q (A) with low Gram-Schmidt norm. Here we use an
improved algorithm from [26].
Theorem 1: Let q > 3 be odd and m := d6n log qe. There
is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm TrapGen(q,n)
that outputs a pair (A ∈ Zn×mq ,S ∈ Zn×m) such that A is
statistically close to a uniformmatrix inZn×mq and S is a basis
for 3⊥q (A) satisfying
‖˜S‖ 6 O(√n log q) and ‖S‖ 6 O(n log q)
with all but negligible probability in n.
D. THE LWE PROBLEMS
In this paper, the security of our construction is reduced to
the learning with errors problem, which may be seen as aver-
age case problem related to the family of lattices described
above.
Definition 4 (Learning With Errors [24]): For a prime q,
a positive integer n, and a distribution χ over Zq, the LWEq,χ
problem is to distinguish, given oracle access to any desired
m = poly(n) samples, between the distribution As,χ (for
uniformly random and secret s ∈ Znq)and the uniform dis-
tribution over Znq × Zq.
We give an outline of Gaussian distributions over lattice.
For any s > 0 and dimension m ≥ 1, the Gaussian function
ρs : Rm → (0, 1] is defined as ρs(x) = exp(−pi‖x‖2/s2).
For any coset 3⊥y (A), and probability zero elsewhere. We
summarize several facts from the literature about discrete
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Gaussian over lattices, again specialized to our family of
interest.
Lemma 2 ( [25], Lemma 4.4): For any n-dimensional lat-
tice 3, vector c ∈ Rn, and reals 0 <  < 1, s > η(3) (the
smoothing parameter η(3) is the smallest real s > 0 such
that ρ1/s(3∗\{0}) 6 ), we have
Pr
x∼D3,s,c
{‖x− c‖ > s√n} 6 1+ 
1−  · 2
−n
Lemma 3 [19]: There are two PPT algorithms
SampeGaussia(A,TA, σ, c) and a PPT algorithm
SampePre(A,TA, σ , u), the former returns x ∈ 3⊥q (A) drawn
from a distribution statistically close toD3,s,c, and the latter
returns x ∈ 3uq(A) sampled from a distribution statistically
close to D3uq(A),σ , whenever 3uq(A) is not empty, where TA
be a basis for 3⊥q (A) and σ > ‖T˜A‖ω(
√
logm), for c ∈ Rm
and u ∈ Znq.
E. ENCODING VECTORS AS MATRICES
Our construction needs a function Hf : Znq −→ Zn×nq which
is able to map vectors (in Znq) to matrices (in Zn×nq ), and
the security proof of our scheme requires the function sat-
isfying strong injectivity, i.e., for two distinct vectors u, v,
det(Hf(u)−Hf(v)) 6= 0.
Definition 5: Selecting a prime q and a positive integer n.
We say that a function Hf : Znq −→ Zn×nq is an encoding with
full rank differences (FRD) if:
1. For all distinct u, v ∈ Znq, the matrix Hf(u) − Hf(v) ∈
Zn×nq is full rank.
2. Hf is computable in polynomial time.
We use an injective FRD encoding function in [26], and a
short instruction is as follows. We have the finite field Zq,
a polynomial g ∈ F[X ] of degree less than n, and let
coeffs(g) ∈ Fn be defined n-vector which element is coef-
ficients of g. Let f be some polynomial of degree n in F[X ]
that is irreducible. For input u = (u0, u1, . . . , un−1) define
the polynomial g(x) =∑n−1i=0 uix i.
Define Hf(u) as
Hf(u) :=

coeffs(g)
coeffs(x · gmodf )
coeffs(x2 · gmodf )
...
coeffs(xn−1 · gmodf )
 ∈ Fn×n (1)
Theorem 2 [27]: Let F be a field and f a polynomial
in F[X ]. If f is irreducible in F(X ) then the function Hf(u)
defined in (1) is an encoding with full rank differences.
F. THE BINARY-TREE DATA STRUCTURE
In order to reduce the number of re-encryption key update
(on the side of delegator), we use a binary tree [6] and further
assign re-encryption key to leaf node of the tree. Each user has
keys computed on of all nodes on the path from the leaf node
corresponding to that user to the root node for the decryption
of ciphertext encrypted under the time period t. When no user
Algorithm 1 KUNodes
Require: BT, RL, t
1: X,Y←− ∅
2: for (νi, ti) ∈ RL do
3: if ti 6 t then add Path(νi) to X end if
4: end for
5: for θ ∈ X do
6: if θl /∈ X then add θl to Y end if
7: if θr /∈ X then add θr to Y end if
8: end for
9: if Y = ∅ then add root to Y end if
10: return Y
is revoked, the delegator just needs to submit the key update
computed on the node of binary tree to the proxy. When a
certain number of users are revoked, delegator first locates
the minimal set of nodes in the tree which contains a common
ancestor among all the leaf nodes for non-revoked users.
We use the following notations. BT denotes the binary
tree. If root denotes root node and ν denotes a leaf node,
the Path(ν) denotes the set of node on the path from ν
to the root(including ν and the root). If θ is a non-
leaf node, θl and θr denote the left and right child of θ .
We assume that the mark of each re-encryption key, such as
rkA−→B, rkA−→C , rkA−→D, . . . , is assigned to each leaf node ν.
Upon system registration, the delegator provides the proxy
with a set of distinct re-encryption keys for each node in
Path(ν).
We here present an KUNodes algorithm which takes as
input a binary tree BT, a time t, and a revocation list RL.
The delegator is able to determine a minimal set Y which
includes none ancestor of node in RL with corresponding
time on or before t (revoked re-encryption key), and all other
leaf nodes (non-revoked re-encryption key) have exactly
one ancestor in the set Y. In other words, the algorithm
KUNodes finds a minimal set containing ancestors of non-
revoked re-encryption key. Its output is all non-revoked chil-
dren of the revoked nodes. The delegator further publishes a
re-encryption key update for all nodes in Y.
A mark of re-encryption key is assigned to every leaf
node ν, and then to form a valid re-encryption key cor-
responding to the time t if the set Y and Path(ν) have a
common node. Through this operation, every revocation list
RL only needs the delegator to carry out the logarithmic
work of the maximal number of re-encryption keys and lin-
ear number of revoked re-encryption keys. Figure 2a shows
an example where there is no revoked user, while Bob is
revoked and those nodes flagged by ‘‘1" are included in set Y
in Figure 2b.
III. SYNTAX OF RPRE
We start with defining the general syntax of a revocable proxy
re-encryption scheme.
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FIGURE 2. Examples of binary tree revocation structure. (a) No user is revoked. (b) User B is revoked.
A. SYSTEM DEFINITION
Definition 6 (Revocable Proxy Re-Encryption): A proxy
re-encryption with revocability includes nine probabilis-
tic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms, namely Setup,
KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, ReKeyGen, UpKey, ReEnc,
ReKeyRev, and UpCip with associated message space M,
time space T . We assume that the size of T is polynomial in
the security parameter 1n. Each algorithm is run by either
one of parties, proxy, delegator, and delegatee. The proxy
maintains a revocation list RL and state ST. In what follows,
an algorithm is called stateful if it updates RL or ST. Here we
regard time space as discrete rather than continuous.
• (param,RL, ST ) ← Setup (1n): Intake a security
parameter n, the setup algorithm outputs a global public
parameter param, a revocation list RL(initially empty),
and a state ST, where n ∈ N.
• (pk, sk) ← KeyGen (param): Intake param, the key
generation algorithm outputs a public key pk and a
secret key sk . We let param include into the following
algorithms as an implicit input.
• C ← Encrypt(pk,M , t): Intake a public key pk , a mes-
sage M ∈ M, and a time t ∈ T , the encryption
algorithm outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C.
• rkpk→pk ′|t ← ReKeyGen(pk, sk, pk ′, t,RL, ST ):
Intake two public keys pk, pk ′, a private key sk , a time
t ∈ T , the revocation list RL, and the state ST,
the re-encryption key generation algorithm outputs a
re-encryption key rkpk→pk ′|t or a special symbol ⊥
indicating that pk ′ has been revoked.
• upkeyt→t′ ← UpKey(pk, sk, t, t′, ST ): Intake a public
key pk , a private key sk , two time periods t < t′ ∈ T
and the state ST, the update key generation algorithm
outputs a update key upkeyt→t′ .
• Ct′ ← UpCip(pk,C, upkeyt→t′ , ST ): Intake the public
key pk , the state ST , a cipherext C of pk at time t and
a update key upkeyt→t′ , the update ciphertext algorithm
outputs the updated ciphertext of pk at time t′, where
t < t′.
• CR ← ReEnc(rk,C): Intake a proxy re-encryption
key rk and a ciphertext C , the re-encryption algorithm
outputs a ciphertext CR.
• RL ← ReKeyRev(pk, pk ′, t,RL, ST ): Intake public
keys pk, pk ′, a revocation time t ∈ T , the revocation list
RL, and the state ST , the re-encryption key revocation
algorithm outputs an updated revocation list RL.
• M ← Decrypt(sk,C): Intake a secret key sk and a
ciphertext C , the decryption algorithm outputs a mes-
sage M ∈M.
Correctness: The correctness requires that for all n ∈ N,
t ∈ T , M ∈ M, all (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(param), and all
possible valid states ST and revocation lists RL, if a user
with the public key pk was not revoked before or, at time t,
the followings hold:
• We have Decrypt(sk,Encryption(pk,M , t0)) = M ,
where t0 ≤ t;
• We have Decrypt(sk,UpCip(pk,Encryption
(pk, M , t0), UpKey(pk, sk, t0, t1, ST ), ST )) = M ,
where t0 < t1 ≤ t;
• Given a re-encryption key rkpk→pk ′|t1 ← ReKeyGen
(pk, sk, pk ′, t1,RL, ST ) and for any C ← Encrypt(pk ,
M , t1), we have Decrypt(sk ′,ReEnc(rkpk→pk ′|t1 ,C)) =
M , where t1 ≤ t.
B. SYSTEM WORKFLOW
We here give a concise flow chart to illustrate our system.
We assume there are four system users, in which Alice is
delegator, and the rest of them are delegatees. There are
two blocks in Figure 3, indicating the workflow before and
after revocation, respectively. In general, our system works
as follows. A data owner, Alice, encrypts her data and further
uploads the ciphertext to a semi-trusted cloud server, who
acts as a proxy. To fulfil secure data sharing, with the re-
encryption keys (given by Alice), rkAlice→Bob, rkAlice→Cindy,
rkAlice→Dale, the proxy can convert Alice’s encryption to the
ciphertexts intended for Bob, Cindy and Dale, respectively.
If Alice decides to revoke the decryption rights delegation of
Bob, she may send a request with necessary information to
the proxy. By the necessary information, we mean the new
re-encryption keys for Cindy and Dale along with a cipher-
text update key. The proxy further updates the ciphertext
of Alice by using the update key (without compromising
the underlying plaintext). We here note that the new re-
encryption keys are corresponding to the updated ciphertext
of Alice, so that the proxy is allowed to convert the updated
ciphertexts for Cindy and Dale. In our concrete construction
(which is introduced in Section 4), we relate time period
with encryption such that delegation of decryption rights
(i.e. re-encryption key) is also limited to a time slot. A valid
re-encryption requires that the time slot embedded into the
re-encryption key must match the one associated with the
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FIGURE 3. System Workflow.
ciphertext. The ciphertext update stage lifts the ciphertext
from an old time slot say t to a new one t′, so that the re-
encryption key (from Alice to Bob) under t is effective no
more in re-encryption. In this way, re-encryption is only valid
for the non-revoked users, Cindy and Dale. It is worth of
mentioning that wemake use of binary tree structure to reduce
the re-encryption key update complexity to O(logN ) in this
paper, where N is the number of delegatee.
C. SECURITY NOTION
We formalize the RPRE-CCA security below. Our security
model considers not only the standard notion of PRE security
but also the re-encryption key revocability.
RPRE-CCA Game: Let 1n be the security parameter, A be
any PPT adversary. Consider the following experiment for a
RPRE scheme 5 with a plaintext spaceM, a key space K,
a ciphertext space C and the revocation list RL and the
state ST :
Before proceeding to security game, we divide all
users into two categories: honest user (HU) and corrupted
user (CU). HU is a set of honest users only allowing A to
know the corresponding public keys, while CU is a set of
corrupted users manipulated by A.
Setup: Output the public parameters param, a revocation
list RL (initially empty), and a state ST, where param is sent
to A. A is given the target pk∗ and time t∗, labeling it as
honest.
Phase 1: A can adaptively make a polynomial number of
queries of the following oracles O = (OKeyGen, OReKeyGen,
OUpKey, OReEnc, ODec, OReKeyRev, OUpCip):
• OKeyGen: if A request a key of user i with a tag
honest , the challenger returns pki and records i ∈ HU ;
otherwise, the challenger returns (pki, ski) and records
i ∈ CU , where (pki, ski)← KeyGen(param).
• OReKeyGen: A is allowed to ask a re-encryption key
query rkpk→pk ′|t from pk to pk ′ under a time t, the chal-
lenger responds by running the ReKeyGen algorithm to
generate a re-encryption key rkpk→pk ′|t for the adversary.
If a query indicates that pk = pk ′ or pk ∈ HU , pk ′ ∈
CU , it will be ignored. The adversary can repeat poly-
nomial times for different couple of identities.
• OReEnc: A is allowed to query re-encryption tuple
(pk, pk ′, t,Cpk ), the challenger responds by running
ReKeyGen algorithm to generate a re-encryption key
rkpk→pk ′|t and further computing ciphertext Cpk ′ by run-
ning ReEnc algorithm. If pk = pk ′ or pk ∈ HU , pk ′ ∈
CU , the query will be ignored.
• ODec: A is allowed to ask a decryption query on C of
user pk (where pk 6= pk∗), the challenger runs Decrypt
to return m.
• OReKeyRev: A outputs a tuple (pk , t), the challenger
updates RL by running ReKeyRev.
• OUpKey: A sends a tuple (pk, t, t′) to the challenger.
The challenger runs the algorithm UpKey to generate
upkeyt→t′ .
• OUpCip: A is allowed to query (pk, t, t′,C). The chal-
lenger runs the algorithm UpCip to convert ciphertext
C under t to the one under t′, where t < t′.
Challenge: A outputs two equal length plaintext m0,
m1 ∈ M. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
sets the challenge ciphertext to C∗ = Encrypt(pk∗,mb, t∗).
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b′.
The following restrictions must be hold:
• OReKeyGen and OReKeyRev must be queried in non-
decreasing order, i.e., the time of the current queries
must be later than or equal the time of previous queries.
• OReKeyRev cannot be queried at time t, if it has been
queried at t once.
• WhenOReKeyGen is queried at time t∗, user pk∗ must be
in RL.
• A is not allowed to query the decryption oracle for
the challenge ciphertext C∗ of pk∗ at time t∗. If C∗
at time t∗ is converted to C∗ at time t for t∗ < t by
using OUpCip or OUpKey, A still cannot access to the
decryption oracle for the query of C∗ at time t.
We refer to A in the above game as an RPRE-CCA adver-
sary. We define the advantage of A in attacking an RPRE
scheme  as
Adv,A
=
∣∣∣∣Pr
b = b′ :
param← Setup(1n,N )
(m0,m1)← A(param, pk∗, t∗)O
C∗← Encrypt(param, pk∗,mb)
b′← A(C∗)O
− 12
∣∣∣∣
Definition 7: We say that an RPRE scheme is CCA secure
if for all probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A and neg-
ligible function ε, we always have that Adv,A is a negligible
function, that is, Adv,A 6 ε
IV. CONSTRUCTION
A. INTUITION OF OUR CONSTRUCTION
We first consider how to establish a connection between
public key and time period for a user. Recall that a public
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key in a PRE scheme consists of three parts: the first two
parts [A0|A1] (of the pk = ([A0|A1|A2]) are regarded as an
entirety, and the last part [A2] is regarded as the other entirety
in our construction. The re-encryption key is generated in the
following two steps. First, we choose two matrices randomly,
namely, AR and AL, such that the sum of the two equals the
first two parts of pk . We extract SRKR and SRKL through
a Gaussian sampler from the AR, AL, and further store them
in the nodes θ ∈ Path(v) and θ ∈ KUNodes(v), respectively.
Second, we add a random vector s to protect the time period
from being cancelled out during some computation intaking
the partA2.Xθ,t is also extracted through a Gaussian sampler
and stored in the node θ ∈ KUNodes(v). The revocation
of re-encryption key relies on if SRKR, SRKL, and URKt
are in the same node of the tree. In order to answer the re-
encryption key query issued by adversary in the simulation,
we divided the first two parts of pkA into U[AR1 |AR2 ] and
[I − U][AL1 |AL2 ] in accordance with a certain proportion
of U : [I − U], where U is a unimodular matrix. Since
the challenger of the security game will not have the private
keys of honest users, we exploit Gaussian random sampling
method to extract R∗1 and R∗2 from the Gauss distribution to
construct honest user’s public key pk = ([A0| − A0R1| −
A0R2 −Hf(t∗)G],H), and we add −Hf(t∗)G to each honest
user’s key. In this way, we enable the challenger to answer the
queries of re-encryption key and decryption.
B. OUR RPRE SCHEME
Below we present our RPRE scheme from lattices.
• Setup(1n): On input a security parameter 1n, it chooses
r that is a fixed function w(
√
logn). Set the modulus q =
pe = poly(n) and k = O(logn). The dimension of the public
key is m = l + 2nk , where l = O(nk). We adopt the stan-
dard trapdoor generation function in [16] to build the gadget
matrix G and the two functions associated with it, namely,
the invert function gG and the sampler fG. The trapdoors
R1,R2 ∼ Dl×nk so that (A0,A0R1,A0R2) is negl(n)−far
from uniformly distribution Zn×lq × Zn×nkq × Zn×nkq . All
H ∈ Zn×nq that are used in our scheme are invertible, and
the difference between two such matrices, H′ − H′′, is also
invertible. This occurs with a non-negligible probability of
(1 − 1/p)e when p is prime. Therefore we can always find
those matrices with rejection samplings.
The LWE error rate 1/α = O((nk)3) · r3. We define an
encoding function as enc(m) = Bm ∈ Znk , which encodes
the message space {0, 1}nk to the cosets of 3/23 for the
lattice 3 = 3(G>) using any basis B ∈ Znk of 3, and this
encoding can be efficiently inverted.
• KeyGen(param): On input A0 $←− Zn×lq , R1,R2 $←−
Dl×nk , an invertible matrix H $←− Zn×nq . The public
key is pk = (A,H) where A = [A0|A1|A2] =
[A0|−A0R1|−A0R2] ∈ Zn×(l+2nk)q . The private key is sk =
[R1|R2] ∈ Zl×2nk .
• Encryption(pk,m, t): On input m ∈ {0, 1}nk , a vector
r
$←− Znq, a time vector t ←− Znq. Compose Au = [A0|A1 +
HG|A2 + Hf(t)G], and sample three error vectors e0 $←−
DlZ,αq, e1, e2
$←− DnkZ,s, where s2 = (‖e0‖2 + lαq2) · r2. The
composed error vector is concatenated by the three vectors
e = (e0|e1|e2) ∈ Zm. Let
b> = 2(r>[A0|A1 +HG|A2 +Hf(t)G] mod q)
+ e> + (0, 0, enc(m))> mod 2q (2)
where the dimension of first zero vector is l, and that of
the second is nk . Return the ciphertext c = b ∈ Zm2q.
• Decryption(pk, sk, c): Recall that pk = [A,H],
sk = [R1|R2], and c = b. ComputeAu = [A0|A1+HG|A2+
Hf(t)G] through matrixHu, and perform the following steps:
1) Output ⊥ if the form of c is invalid or Hf(t) = 0.
Otherwise, call the algorithm InvertO([R1|R2], Au, b,
Hf(t)) to get values z ∈ Znq and e = (e0, e1, e2) ∈
Zlq×Znkq ×Znkq so that b> = z>Au+ e> mod q. If the
call to Invert fails for any reason, output ⊥.
2) If ‖e0‖ > αq
√
l or e1, e2 > αq
√
2lnk · w(√log n),
output ⊥.
3) Let v = b − e mod 2q, parsed as v = (v0, v1, v2) ∈
Zl2q × Znk2q × Znk2q. If v0 /∈ 23(A0>), output ⊥.
Otherwise, compute
v>
R1 R2I 0
0 I
 mod 2q ∈ Znk2q
and apply encode−1 to the last nk coordinates if it
exists, otherwise output ⊥.
• ReKeyGen(pk, sk, pk ′, t,RL,ST):
Recall that pk = ([A0|A1|A2],H), sk = [R1|R2], and
pk ′ = ([A′0|A′1|A′2],H′). In this step, the algorithm’s input
is the public key of the delegator and the delegatee, and a part
of re-encryption key needed in our construction is generated
by the private key of the delegator. The specific process is as
follows:
1) For each θ ∈ Path(υ), if AR and AL have not to
been defined, the first two items of the delegatee’s
public key [A′0|A′1 +H′G] would be divided into two
parts: denoted byAR andAL satisfy [A′0|A′1 +H′G] =
AR + AL.
We make AR parse as two matrices AR1 ∈ Zn×lq and
AR2 ∈ Zn×nkq . Making use of the first part of the
secret key R1(the Gaussian matrix) and the invertible
matrixH ∈ Zn×nq from the public key. More concretely,
we sample column wise so that for each column ofAR1
and obtain an l + nk dimensional column of the part
of re-encryption key by executing SampleO. And we
derive an (l+nk)× l matrix after sampling l times and
parse it as two matrices X00 ∈ Zl×l and X10 ∈ Znk×l
with Gaussian entries of parameter s.
[A0| − A0R1 +HG]
(
X00
X10
)
= [AR1 ]
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And continue sampling for the cosets obtained from the
columns of AR2 , we derive an (l + nk) × nk matrix
after sampling nk times and parse it as two mtrices
X01 ∈ Zl×nk and X11 ∈ Znk×nk with Gaussian entries
of parameter s
√
l
2 :
[A0| − A0R1 +HG]
(
X01
X11
)
= [AR2 ]
Combined with the above two steps, we could get
[A0| − A0R1 +HG]
(
X00 X01
X10 X11
)
= [AR1 |AR2 ] = [AR] (3)
We denote
(
X00 X01
X10 X11
)
by Xθ,R, then store ARXθ,R
in node θ ∈ Path(υ), and output SRKR =
(θ,Xθ,R)θ∈Path(υ).
2) For each θ ∈ KUNodes(υ), if AR and AL are not
defined, by the above definition we definiteAR andAL
to satisfy [A′0|A′1 +H′G] = AR + AL.
The same calculation method as the first step is adopted
to generate Xθ,L =
(
X′00 X
′
01
X′10 X
′
11
)
correspond to AL, and
store AL and Xθ,L in the node θ ∈ KUNodes, that is
[A0|−A0R1 + HG]
(
X′00 X
′
01
X′10 X
′
11
)
= [AL]. And output
SRKL = (θ,Xθ,L)θ∈KUNodes(υ).
3) In this step, our algorithm whose input is the public key
of the delegator and the delegatee and the private key of
the delegator is used to generate the time-control part
of the proxy re-encryption key needed in the scheme.
The specific process is as follows:
Select matrix function Hf(x) : x −→ Zn×nq , x ∈ Znq
whose input is the time vector t ∈ Znq and the random
vector s
$←− Znq. In order to hold the containing time t
item in the final term, we have to make the containing
t item on both sides of the equation inequality, to avoid
it being eliminated(under the assumption that the third
column and the third row of proxy re-encryption key
are identity matrix I). So we introduce a random vector
s
$←− Znq in A2 + Hf(t)G, make the right-hand side of
the equation A′2 +Hf(t+ s)G:
[A0|A1 +HG|A2 +Hf(t)G]
X02X12
I

= [A′2 +Hf(t+ s)G] (4)
The method used here is the same as SRKeyGen
in the previous step. Sampling for the cosets is
obtained from the columns of the matrix A′2 − A2 +
(Hf(t+ s)−Hf(t))G by executing SampleO.
The outputs, namely X02 ∈ Zl×nk ,X12 ∈
Znk×nk , have Gaussian distributed entries with
parameter s
√
l:
[A0|A1 +HG]
(
X02
X12
)
= A′2 − A2 + (Hf(t+ s)−Hf(t))G (5)
We denote
(
X02
X12
)
by Xθ,t, and then store θ and Xθ,t
in node θ ∈ KUNodes(υ), and output URKt =
(θ,Xθ,t)θ∈KUNodes(υ).
4) ∀(α,Xα,R) ∈ SRKR, (β,Xβ,L) ∈ SRKL , (γ,Xγ,t ) ∈
URKt , if ∃(α, β, γ ) satisfies α = β = γ then the
re-encryption key is a matrix with Gaussian entries:
rk =
(
Xθ,R + Xθ,L Xθ,t
0 I
)
=
X00 X01 X02X10 X11 X12
0 0 I
; (6)
on the otherwise, if any two sets of SRKR,SRKL and
URKt do not have a common node, rk ←− ⊥.
5) Output re-encryption key rk satisfying:
[A0|A1 +HG|A2 +Hf(t)G]
(
Xθ,R + Xθ,L Xθ,t
0 I
)
= [A′0|A′1 +H′G|A′2 +Hf(t+ s)G] (7)
• UpKey(pk, t′, t, ST , sk): Recall that sk = [R1|R2]. The
delegator would generate a proxy re-encryption key rkt′→t,
and the ciphertext of delegator would be converted at time t′
to the time t by the proxy. Using the first part of private
key sk : R1 and the invertible matrix H of the public key,
and executing SampleO algorithm(similar to the operations
in algorithm ReKeyGen), output X1 ∈ Zl×nk ,X2 ∈ Znk×nk ,
where
[A0|A1 +HG]
(
X1
X2
)
= Hf(t)−Hf(t′)G
The re-encryption key is the matrix:
rkt′→t =
I 0 X10 I X2
0 0 I

• ReEnc(rk, c): Recall that c = (Hu,b). Convert the
ciphertext of delegator to the ciphertext of delegatee by
using the proxy re-encryption key. The specific process is as
follows:
b> · rk
= 2(r>[A0|A1 +HG|A2 +Hf(t)G] mod q)
+ e> + (0, 0, enc(m))> ·
X00 X01 X02X10 X11 X12
0 0 I
 mod 2q
= 2(r>[A0′|A1′ +H′G|A2′ +Hf(t+ s)G] mod q)
+ e> + (0, 0, enc(m))> mod 2q,
where e = (e0, e1, e2) = (e0X00 + e1X01, e0X01 +
e1X11, e0X02 + e1X12 + e2).
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Finally, we output the ciphertext c = (Hf(t+ s)G,b)
• ReKeyRev(pk, pk ′, t,RL, ST ): On input a public key
pk ′ = ([A0′|A1′|A2′,H′]), a time t, the revocation list RL,
and the state ST, the algorithm adds (pk −→ pk ′, t) to RL for
all nodes v associated with pk −→ pk ′ and return RL.
• UpCipher(pk, b>, rkt→t′ , ST , ): When user pk is
revoked and the proxy re-encryption keys are updated,
the proxy could re-encrypt the ciphertext of delegator at time t
to time t′ as follows:
b> · rkt→t′
= 2(r>[A0|A1 +HG|A2 +Hf(t)G] mod q)
+ e> + (0, 0, enc(m))> ·
I 0 X10 I X2
0 0 I
 mod 2q
= 2(r>[A0|A1 +HG|A2 +Hf(t′)G] mod q)
+ e˜> + (0, 0, enc(m))> mod 2q,
where e˜ = (e˜0, e˜1, e˜2) = (e0, e1, e0X1 + e1X2 + e2).
Correctness. We present the correctness of our scheme
by showing both the original ciphertext and the re-encrypted
ciphertext can be decrypted correctly. We verify that the
process of re-encryption. The proxy can convert ciphertext of
pk to pk ′ through the corresponding re-encryption key where
the pk ′ is not a revoked user: ∀(α,Xα,R) ∈ SRKR, (β,Xβ,L) ∈
URKt , (γ,Xγ,t ) ∈ URKt , ∃(α, β, γ ) satisfies α =
β = γ . We can chalk up rk =
(
Xθ,R + Xθ,L Xθ,t
0 I
)
by running ReKeyGen(SRKR,SRKL ,URKt). We further
call the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc to get ciphertext
2(r>[A0′|A1′ + H′G|A2′ + Hf(t+ s)G] mod q) + e> +
(0, 0, enc(m))> mod 2q.
We here explore that how to set appropriate parameters
include size of noise so that the re-encrypted ciphertext can
be decrypted correctly. Our scheme has the same parameter
setting of the original ciphertext as [16]. And the parameter
setting of the re-encrypted ciphertext is as same as [3]’s,
by taking 1/α = O(nk)3 · r3 we have the desired property for
both error terms: e0R′1+e1, e0R′2+e2 ∈ P1/2(q·B(−>)). It can
be proved that the Decryption algorithm in our revocable
proxy re-encryption scheme is correct.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first elaborate that our scheme is immune to a means of
attack in [4]. The attack method adopted in that article is that
the adversary can tell the real system from the simulation
system by distinguishing an equation with public key and
proxy re-encryption key. The basic reason is that the second
part of the third item — HuG is equal in two sides of the
following equation:
[A0|A1 +HG|A2 +HuG]
X02X12
I
 = [A′2 +HuG].
It is easy to check and compare with equation:
[A0|A1 +HG]
X02X12
I

= [A∗0| − A∗R∗1]
X00X10
I
 · R′2 6= A′2 − A2. (8)
The adversary could easily tell if the public key pk1, pk2,
proxy re-encryption key rk are from the real system or the
simulation system after using the above comparison method.
But our scheme is immune to this attack. We add a random
vector s ←− Znq into the third part of matrix so that the time
term on both sides of the equation would not be eliminated,
and the adversary cannot distinguish the real system and the
simulation system effectively.
[A0|A1 +HG|A2 +Hf(t)G]
X02X12
I
 = [A′2 +Hf(t+ s)G]
(9)
Next we consider the security proof of our scheme. The
challenger has to possess R and an invertible H so that he
could solve the LWE problem successfully.
The simulator must guarantee that he is able to answer
the query of adversary, that is H is an invertible matrix.
However, once the adversary askes decryption query about
challenge ciphertext, then H is the zero matrix, the simulator
cannot transform it to a G − trapdoor matrix and decrypt
it to recover the corresponding plaintext. Therefore, there is
no invertible H involved, we embed LWE instance into the
challenge ciphertext, and the output of the adversary will help
us tackle the decision-LWE problem.
Theorem 3: Our scheme is CCA-secure under conditions
of decision-LWE where α′ = α/3 > 2√n/q.
Proof: First, we transform the LWE distributionAs,α′ =
(a, b =< s, a > /q + e mod 1) to (a, 2(< s, a > modq) +
e′ mod 2q), where e′ −→ DZα,q , b −→ 2qb + DZ2qb,s, s2 =
(αq)2 − (2α′q)2 > 4n > η(Z)2. This converts a uniform
distribution on Znq × T to a discretized uniform distribution
on Znq × Z2q. Once the LWE samples are the required style,
we construct a column-wisematrixA0∗ and b∗, the public key
of the target user is generated as follows: select a invertible
matrix H1∗, a time vector t∗ and a matrix function Hf(x),
private key R1∗,R2∗ ∈ D, output the public key pkA∗ =
([A0∗|−A0∗R1∗−H1∗G|−A0∗R1∗−Hf(t∗)G],H1∗), where
t∗ is statistically hidden from the adversary.
We choose X00 and X10 from a Gaussian distribution with
parameter s so as to generate public key of valid user. First,
we set a unimodular matrix U ∈ Zl×lq , and two matrices
AR1 ,AR2 are generated respectively: Let
U−1[A0∗| − A0∗R1∗]
(
X00
X10
)
= AR1 ,
[A0∗| − A0∗R1∗]
(
X00
X10
)
= UAR1 ,
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and
U−1[A0∗| − A0∗R1∗]
(
X00
X10
)
R′1 = A′0R′1,
[A0∗| − A0∗R1∗]
(
X00
X10
)
R′1 = UAR2 .
Let X′
θ,R be denoted by [
(
X00
X10
)
|
(
X00
X10
)
R′1]. And put
X′
θ,R into node θ ∈ Path(υ), and continue to produce X′θ,L.
We choose X′00 and X
′
01 from the Gaussian distribution
with parameter s, make
[I− U]−1[A∗0| − A∗0R∗1]
(
X′00
X′10
)
= A′L1 ,
[A∗0| − A∗0R∗1]
(
X′00
X′10
)
= [I− U]AL1 ,
and
[I− U]−1[A∗0| − A∗0R∗1]
(
X′00
X′10
)
R′1 = A′0L′2,
[A∗0| − A∗0R∗1]
(
X′00
X′10
)
R′1 = [I− U]AL2 .
Let X′
θ,L be denoted by [
(
X′00
X′10
)
|
(
X′00
X′10
)
R′1], And put
X′
θ,L into node θ ∈ KUNodes(υ), noticing that [A∗0| −
A∗0R
∗
1][X
′
θ,R + X′θ,L] = [UAR1 + [I− U]AL1 |UAR2 +
[I− U]AL2 ] = [A′0| − A′0R′1].
We choose R′2 ∈ Zl×nkq from a distribution B defined
over Z that outputs 0 with probability 1/2 and±1 with prob-
ability 1/4 each: [A∗0| − A∗0R∗1]
(
X′00
X′10
)
R′2 = A′0R′2. So the
whole public key of a honest user is pk ′ = ([A′0| − A′0R′1| −
A′0R
′
2 − Hf(t∗)G]). We add −Hf(t∗)G to each honest key.
A′0R
′
1 is negl(n)-far from uniform and −Hf(t∗) is concealed
from adversary.
Let (
X′00
X′10
)
+
(
X00
X10
)
=
(
X00
X10
)
,(
X′00
X′10
)
R′1 +
(
X00
X10
)
R′1 =
(
X01
X11
)
,(
X′00
X′10
)
R′2 =
(
X02
X12
)
,
and(
X00 + X′00 X01 + X′01 X′02
X10 + X′10 X11 + X′11 X′12
)
=
(
X00 X01 X02
X10 X11 X02
)
(10)
each entry of the resulting matrices X01,X11,X′01,X
′
11,
X′02,X
′
12 is the inner of product of a Gaussian l-dimensional
row-vector and a {0,−1, 1}-vector with half of the coor-
dinates equal zero, which is equivalent to l/2 additions of
Gaussians with parameter s. Since in the scheme we obtain
(
X01
X11
)
,
(
X02
X12
)
with parameter s
√
l/2, then the simulated re-
encryption key is
rkpk∗−→pk ′ =
X00 X01 X02X10 X11 X12
0 0 I
.
1. If no valid user is revoked, KUNodes(BT ,RL, t∗)
⋂
Path(v∗) = ∅ the challenger replies the query about private
key of id∗ through {(θ, e =
(
X00 X01
X10 X11
)
)}θ∈path(v∗) and a
update key query for t∗ and {(θ, e1 =
(
X00′ X01′
X10′ X11′
)
, e2 =(
X02
X12
)
)}θ∈KUNodes(BT ,RL,t∗).
2. If a user is revoked, that is rev = 1, the produce
way of keys are as above. But the challenger can only reply
an updated key query for t∗ through
(
X′00
X′10
)
R′2 for θ, θ ∈
KUNodes(BT ,RL, t∗)
Next we consider the decryption query about ciphertext
c = (Hf(t′),b) for pk ′ = ([A′0| − A0R′1| − A′0R′2 −
Hf(t∗)G],H′), where
b> = 2(r>[A0′|A1′ +HG|A2′ + (Hf(t∗)
−Hf(t′))G] mod q)+ e> + (0, 0, enc(m))> mod 2q
(11)
We first check that Hf(t′) is invertible or not, and call
InvertO algorithm whenHf(t∗)−Hf(t′) is a invertible matrix,
whose input is (sk = [R′1|R′2],Au = [A0′|A1′ + HG|A2′ +
(Hf(t∗)−Hf(t′))G,b, (Hf(t∗)−Hf(t′))]), output is (z, e) ∈ Znq
to satisfy b = zAu + e mod q. If norm of e is small enough,
v = b− e = (v0, v1, v2), maintaining v0 ∈ Zlq and
v0 ∈ 23(A0>), we could obtain that v = 2(rAu mod q) +
(0, 0, enc(m)) mod 2q.
Wemultiply thematrix to perform the decryption operation
v
R1 R2I 0
0 I
 = 2(r>[H′G|Hf(t∗)−Hf(t′)])+ (0, 0, enc(m)).
And the messagem could be recovered by running the enc−1
algorithm at the last nk coordinates. So the simulator can
answer the decryption query of c = (b>,Hf(t′)) for valid
user with an overwhelming probability if t′ 6= t∗, Otherwise,
return ⊥.
In order to answer the re-encryption query from pk ′ =
([A′0| − A0R′1| − A′0R′2 − Hf(t∗)G] with H′ ∈ Zn×nq to
pk ′′ = ([A′′0| −A′′0R′′1| −A′′0R′′2 −Hf(t∗)G] with H′′ ∈ Zn×nq ,
we convert
b> = 2(r>[A0′|A1′ +HG|A2′ + (Hf(t∗)
−Hf(t′))G] mod q)+ e> + (0, 0, enc(m))> mod 2q
(12)
VOLUME 6, 2018 61173
W. Yin et al.: Delegation of Decryption Rights With Revocability From Learning With Errors
to
b′> = 2(r>[A0′′|A1′′ +HG|A2′′ + (Hf(t∗)
−Hf(t′))G] mod q)+ e′> + (0, 0, enc(m))> mod 2q
(13)
by the re-encryption key rkpk ′−→pk ′′ , which is decrypted by
sk ′′ = [R′′1|R′′2].
To answer the UpKey query of pk∗ from t′ to t, the chal-
lenger uses the first part of private key R∗1 and the algorithm
SampleO, output X∗1,X
∗
2. The re-encryption key returned is
rkt′→t =
I 0 X∗10 I X∗2
0 0 I
. The query about UpCipher could
be answered by the ciphertext at time t′ multiply by the
re-encryption key rkt′→t.
Finally, let us consider the challenge ciphertext of
m ∈ {0, 1}nk , which is generated by the public key pk∗. The
challenge ciphertext is b′> = 2(r>[A0∗|A1∗|A2∗] mod q) +
e> + (0, 0, enc(m))> mod 2q when t′ = t∗, and s ∈ Znq and
e are fairly small.
We use b∗ at the beginning of game rather than calcu-
lated b. The b∗ = 2(r>A∗0 mod q) + e˜0 mod q is LWE
distribution where s←− Znq, e˜0 ←− DZ,αq. We set the first nk
item of b∗t to be b0>, the later 2nk item of b∗t to be
b1> = b0>R1∗ + e˜1> mod 2q ∈ Z2qnk
b2> = b0>R2∗ + e˜2> + enc(m) mod 2q ∈ Z2qnk ,
where e1, e2←− Dnkαq√m,r . So the final challenge ciphertext
is b = (b0>,b1>,b2>), t∗ which has the same distribu-
tion as the ciphertext in the real system. The noise term
in b1> is e˜0R1 + e˜1>, which has negl(n)-distance with
DZ,s where s2 = (‖e˜02 + l(αq)2 · r2‖), the same to b>2 .
Notice that R∗1,R
∗
2 ←− D, (A∗0R∗1,A∗0R∗2,−b∗R∗1,−b∗R∗2)
is negl(n)-uniform distribution according to LHL(leftover
hash lemma) and A∗0,b
∗ is uniform distribution. There-
fore, the challenge ciphertext in the view of adver-
sary has the same distribution as what ciphertext in the
real system is, therefore the adversary cannot distinguish
them.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of revocable PRE
and further designed a concrete construction satisfying the
notion. In the construction, the revocability is reflected on
the update of re-encryption key. We have leveraged binary
tree structure to reduce the complexity of re-encryption key
update to O(logN ), where N is the number of delegatees.
We also have considered the update of ciphertexts so that a
revoked user (at time period t) cannot gain access to all the
ciphertexts encrypted before t . That allows us to maintain
forward security. Besides, our scheme enjoys some distinct
features, for example, the generation of re-encryption key
is non-interactive, ciphertexts update and re-encryption are
off-loaded to proxy. Our construction is lattice based and
meanwhile proved CCA secure under the LWE assumption in
the standard model. We here leave the efficiency simulation
and implementation of the scheme as parts of our future work.
This paper also leaves some interesting open problems. First
of all, one may consider how to convert our construction
with LWE to the version based on RLWE to reduce stor-
age/communication cost. Second, the revocability currently
is limited to O(logN ). There may be a way to reduce the
complexity to constant.
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